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ABSTRACT
Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Policy with Income-sensitive Capital Flows
J.O.N. Perkins, University of Melbourne
This paper considers some implications for macroeconomic policy in an open economy
if – as appears highly probable – international flows of capital are now significantly
sensitive to changes in income, and to expected changes in income, in different
countries. This assumption is in contrast to that in accepted analysis where international
capital flows are sensitive only to relative interest rates in different countries. One
conclusion is that the effects on the exchange rate (or on the reserves in a fixed-
exchange rate system) of monetary policy in an open economy will be less than if it is
assumed that capital flows react only to changes in interest rates. The effects of fiscal
policy changes upon the exchange rate (or the reserves if the  exchange rate is fixed) will
also be more likely to be largely or fully offset by capital flows than if relative interest
rates alone affected the flow of capital. It will, however, remain true that so long as
capital flows react also to some extent to relative interest rates, monetary policy retains a
comparative advantage over fiscal policy in affecting the exchange rate, or the level of
reserves in a fixed exchange rate system. It is also concluded that if capital flows react to
changing levels of income, a shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates will have less
effect in increasing the domestic effects of changes in monetary policy; and will be less
likely to increase the domestic effect of changes in fiscal policy.2
Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Policy with Income-sensitive Capital Flows*
During the course of the year 2000 there were suggestions in the press that exchange
rates were not responding in the usual way to changes in monetary policy by major
central banks. In particular, a series of tightenings of monetary policy by the European
Central Bank (the ECB) appeared to be followed by a weakening of the euro (relative to
the US dollar), whereas orthodox analysis would have led one to expect that when a
central bank tightens its monetary policy this would to lead to an appreciation of that
country’s currency, by leading to additional net capital inflow. It was also suggested that
the decision of the Federal Reserve Board not to tighten monetary policy in August 2000
– when there was some expectation in the market that policy would be tightened – may
have led to a strengthening of the US dollar, rather than the reverse.
In each of these cases, the argument was that capital flows were responding mainly to
the expected effect on earnings on equities of the monetary policies in question, rather
than to the changes in interest-rate differentials. That is to say, when the ECB (for
example) raised interest rates relative to those in the US, markets took the view that this
was bad for activity and earnings in Europe, and so discouraged the flow of capital into
European equities. Orthodox analysis, by contrast, would have led one to expect that
capital flows to Europe would have been enhanced by the tightening of monetary policy,
*Comments and suggestions from Neville Norman and Peter Stemp on earlier drafts are
gratefully acknowledged. Neither of these is responsible for remaining deficiencies.3
with capital seeking the higher interest rates in Europe, and perhaps also by causing
European borrowers to become readier to borrow in other countries, where interest rates
had not risen.
If international capital flows are now sensitive mainly to expectations about future
earnings, and perhaps relatively less so to fixed-interest differentials than in the past, this
raises questions for policy, and also for the choice of the appropriate models for
analysing macroeconomic policy in an open economy. The issues raised may be
especially relevant for large countries – the US and the euro area, at least, and perhaps to
some extent also for Japan.
But as the changes in the exchange rate of the euro against the US dollar may well have
repercussions on the exchange rates of other countries, the issues raised are of much
wider relevance. (The apparent tendency of currencies such as the Australian dollar to
follow the euro downwards against the US during 2000 is an example of this.) More
generally, policy-makers in other, small and medium-sized, countries need to consider
whether the choice of the models on which they base their policy decisions needs to be
amended in the light of the effects of earnings expectations upon international capital
flows; or whether, on the other hand, this is a matter of relevance only for the major
central banks of the US and Europe.
This paper discusses the implications for the choice of monetary and fiscal measures for
affecting the exchange rate and other possible macroeconomic targets in an open
economy. Consideration is given to possible distinctions between the relevant analysis4
for very large central banks – the Fed and the ECB, and perhaps also Japan – on the one
hand, and the situation of smaller countries, on the other.
Possible Modifications to Standard Approaches
The accepted analysis of macroeconomic policy in the open economy is on the basis of
capital flows into and out of fixed-interest securities, with money as one asset (usually
only money within the country whose policy is being considered) and ‘bonds’ (that is to
say, fixed-interest rate assets), both domestic and external, as the only other assets.
Equities – including direct investment – are conspicuously absent from the analysis.
This omission could have been defensible if the demand for a country’s bonds and that
for its equities could reasonably be assumed to move together – that is, if they are in
some sense complementary to one another. This could also be true more generally if the
principal factors affecting the attractiveness of bonds move closely in sympathy with
those that affect the attractiveness of equities. Yet neither of these assumptions seems
likely to be generally valid, and certainly not to be an accurate description of
international capital markets today.
Alternatively, the standard assumption about the effects of capital flows responding to
changes in fixed-interest rates could also be defensible if one could assume that the
overwhelming majority of international capital flows are into and out of fixed-interest
assets and liabilities, rather than into and out of equities. In the 1960s when the basic
models (those of Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963)) were first introduced, it may have
been permissible to assume that fixed-interest assets were the dominant ones in
international markets. But the rapid growth of international trading in equities, both5
portfolio and direct investment, in recent years, may raise considerable doubts about
whether such models are any longer appropriate without modification. Indeed, the
question should be why they have persisted for so long to dominate the literature,
including the basic texts, and the thinking of policy-makers, in a world where equity
flows have become so important.
If a tightening of monetary policy leads investors to expect falling earnings on equity
investments (whether portfolio or direct) in the country in question, they may naturally
be expected to invest less in that country. On the other hand, the higher interest rates
available there may still attract fixed-interest investors – and encourage fixed-interest
borrowing from external sources by borrowers in the country where interest rates have
risen. The question is which of these two influences on capital flows may be expected to
predominate. In present-day conditions it seems likely that equity flows are now by far
the more important type of capital flow, especially in the short run.
If so, a tightening of monetary policy by the ECB (for example) may be expected to lead
to a weakening of the euro – rather than the strengthening that orthodox analysis would
lead one to expect. At any rate, this is what one might expect to happen before trade
flows have had time to be affected. When the tightening of monetary policy starts to
reduce activity in Europe, however, the consequent reduction in imports, and possible
stimulus to exports from Europe, could be expected to strengthen the euro. But even in
the medium run, when imports start to fall, and perhaps also exports to rise, with falling
activity in the euro area, one would not expect any strengthening of the euro to be as
great as it would have been if international flows of capital into and out of fixed-interest
assets had still been the dominant form.6
The orthodox analysis argues that, with flexible exchange rates, the downward effects on
activity of a tightening of monetary policy are enhanced by the appreciation that results
when the higher interest rates lead to an increase in fixed-interest flows of capital to the
country where monetary policy is tightened. But if equity flows are nowadays
quantitatively the more important form of capital flow, this enhancement of the efficacy
of changes in monetary policy (brought about by the consequent changes in the
exchange rate) may not occur at all in the short run (before current account effects have
been felt). Even in the longer run it will not be as great as one would have expected in
the light of orthodox analysis relating to fixed-interest capital flows. Indeed, if (as seems
to be certain) equity flows are now the predominant form, a tightening of monetary
policy would lead (in the short run) to a depreciation as capital flows out, and the
consequent depreciation would tend to reduce the extent to which a tightening of
monetary policy reduced domestic activity.
This may not be of great importance in the US or in the euro area, where the channels of
operation of monetary policy are predominantly internal, but they would be of
considerable importance in smaller and medium-sized countries, where the channel of
operation of monetary policy through the exchange rate has probably become of
principal importance in recent years. We should therefore ask whether these
considerations are likely to be important mainly in very large countries, or whether they
have significance for other countries also.7
Major countries compared with smaller countries
There is reason to think that the risk of income-sensitive capital flows dominating those
through fixed-interest markets is greater for very large countries than for others.
For example, when the Fed raises interest rates it cannot reasonably assume that
comparable interest rate rises will not occur in other countries. This means that its ability
to increase US interest rates relative to those elsewhere is limited. The change in capital
flows into fixed-interest securities in the US will thus be less important (relatively
speaking) than for most other countries when they tighten their monetary policies. It is,
however, also likely that the euro area is large enough and significant enough for a
decision to raise interest rates in the euro area to be followed by some outside countries
– at least those in Europe; and a similar argument may also be valid to some extent for
Japan. Here again, therefore, the effects of monetary policy decisions upon fixed-interest
flows may be expected to be of relatively less significance for major central banks than
for the central banks of smaller countries. For flows into and out of equities are
consequently more likely to predominate over those relating to fixed-interest rate assets
for large countries – especially the US and the euro area. It might also be argued that
Japan is of such significance for much of Asia that a substantial tightening of monetary
policy there might lead neighbouring countries to raise interest rates, and thus to reduce
the extent to which interest-sensitive capital flows towards Japan were increased by the
tightening of monetary policy in Japan.
The central bank of a very large country or a group of countries may find that equity
flows are also more significant relative to the effects of policy actions upon the current
account than is true for smaller countries. For policy changes in the US (or in the euro8
area, and perhaps Japan) have significant repercussions on activity in other countries,
and so react back to a significant extent upon the country taking the initial actions. For
example, if the US tightens monetary policy, this will tend to reduce incomes in the rest
of the world, and so hold down the demand for US exports, whereas any such effect is
not significant for smaller countries. This means that it is harder (proportionately) for the
US to achieve a given strengthening of its current account or its exchange rate by
tightening monetary (or fiscal) policy than it is for most other countries. Again, this
increases the likelihood that flows of international capital into and out of equities are
more significant (relatively) for major countries, compared with the orthodox effects –
those through fixed-interest assets and the current account taken together– than for
smaller countries. It should, however, be added that a tightening of policy in the US will
lead eventually to repercussions upon the earnings on equities in the rest of the world,
and to that extent tend eventually to reduce the outflow of equity capital from the US.
In the medium run, however, it remains likely that a tightening of monetary policy in the
US will tend to strengthen the US dollar. For its effects on demand, at least in the
medium or long run, and so on imports into the US, and perhaps still to some extent
through encouraging fixed-interest flows of capital to the US, may well exceed any
downward effects on equity capital flows into the US. Moreover, this may be true even
if the effects on the current account, as well as those on fixed-interest capital flows, are
less (relatively speaking) than for a smaller country. But the combined effects of the
tightening of monetary policy in the US upon net capital flows and the current account
are less likely to strengthen the exchange rate than if (as orthodox theory appears to
assume) the effect on equity flows were insignificant. The tightening of monetary policy
in the US is thus still likely to lead in the medium run to some appreciation of the dollar,9
and that will tend to reduce the extent of any fall in the current account deficit of the US,
and to reinforce the direct effects on activity in the US of the tightening of monetary
policy.
Contrast the situation of the US with that of a smaller country, such as Australia. The
Reserve Bank of Australia does not have to take account of the possibility of other
countries – with the possible exception of New Zealand – following any rise of interest
rates in Australia. It is therefore more likely to be able to increase the interest rates that it
controls relative to the rest of the world than either the Fed or the ECB. Nor does the
RBA normally need to assume that action on its part that reduces activity in Australia
will reduce Australia’s exports indirectly through the multiplier effects on the outside
world – again, with the possible exception of effects on New Zealand. At the same time,
it would be unwise to ignore the possibility of a tightening of monetary policy in
Australia leading to a reduction in net capital flows, at least equity flows, into Australia.
If so, the effect of the tightening of monetary policy in strengthening the exchange rate
will be less than orthodox analysis would have led one to expect; and in the very short
run it could even cause some depreciation.
The impact on equity flows to and from a small or medium-sized country may (as we
have seen above) not be as significant (proportionately) as those through relative interest
rates, compared with  the US or the euro area. But even smaller countries must expect
that there will be some tendency for equity flows to offset – partly or wholly – the
effects of a change in monetary policy upon fixed-interest flows to and from the country
in question. Moreover, for a smaller and more open economy, even a smaller effect on
the exchange rate may be significant as the exchange rate is a much more important10
channel for the operation of monetary policy than it is for larger and less open
economies.
The optimal mix of fiscal and monetary policy
The standard analysis for a country with a flexible exchange rate and fairly mobile
international capital flows is that a tightening of monetary policy is the preferred
instrument for strengthening the exchange rate, or for improving the level of reserves in
a fixed exchange rate system. This is because, for a given impact on the level of income
and on the current account of that country, a change in monetary policy also affects net
(fixed-interest) capital flows in the desired direction. (For example, a tightening of
monetary policy is supposed to lead to additional net capital inflow, which strengthens
the exchange rate and thus enhances the downward effect of the tightening of monetary
policy upon domestic activity.) By contrast, the effects of a change in fiscal policy on
the exchange rate (or on the reserves in a fixed-exchange rate system) through its effects
on capital flows (in fixed-interest markets) tend to offset the effects through the impact
of the fiscal changes in the level of income. (For example, a rise in taxation tends to
reduce demand, and so interest rates, and that discourages fixed-interest capital inflow.
The consequent depreciation tends to reduce the downward impact of the fiscal measure
upon domestic demand.) If the aim is to strengthen the exchange rate (or raise the
reserves), while exerting downward pressure on domestic activity, the preferred
instrument will thus be monetary policy, while fiscal policy would be directed towards
internal balance.
Now consider the case where the predominant form of capital flow is that into and out of
equities. Both tighter monetary policy and a tighter fiscal policy now discourage capital11
flows into equities in the country, and so tend to reduce net capital inflow if this is the
predominant form. But provided that the impact on equity flows is similar for a given
effect on domestic income, whether this comes from monetary or fiscal policy, this does
not upset the general presumption that monetary policy has the comparative advantage
over fiscal policy for achieving a given change in the exchange rate (or the level of the
reserves in a fixed exchange rate system) – so long as there also remain some effects
upon capital flows of changes in the level of interest rates in one country compared with
the rest of the world. (If, however, that form of capital flows becomes insignificant, the
comparative advantage of monetary policy from this point of view would disappear.)
But the other principal conclusion from the standard Mundell-Fleming analysis – that
flexible exchange rates generally enhance the efficacy of monetary policy but generally
not that of fiscal policy – appears to require some revision. A tighter monetary policy
may now reduce net capital inflow (the effects on equity flows exceeding that upon
fixed-interest flows). If so, when monetary policy is tightened, the exchange rate would
tend to depreciate with flexible exchange rates, and that would weaken the deflationary
effect of the tighter monetary policy. (With a fixed exchange rate, by contrast, the
tendency for the reserves to fall would tend to increase the deflationary effect of the
tightening of monetary policy.)
Furthermore, with highly mobile fixed-interest capital flows, under flexible exchange
rates there is a risk that a monetary stimulus may be more or less fully offset by the
outflow of capital from fixed-interest assets when interest rates are reduced through
monetary policy. But the presumption of a downward effect upon total capital inflow of
a monetary stimulus becomes much less likely to be valid with income-sensitive capital12
flows. For the monetary stimulus will then lead to extra capital inflow as a result of the
monetary expansion increasing the level of earnings expected on equity investments in
the country easing monetary policy. A monetary expansion may now therefore cause an
increase in net capital inflow rather than the reduction that occurs if relative interest
rates alone are assumed to affect net capital inflow. This means that under flexible
exchange rates monetary policy could be less effective in influencing domestic activity
that it would if fixed-interest capital flows predominated.
Some aspects of fiscal policy
If capital flows are mainly responsive to earnings expectations rather than to the level of
interest rates, does this have a bearing on the effectiveness of fiscal policy?
With flexible exchange rates, and if flows into and out of fixed-interest assets are the
main form of international capital flows, an easing of fiscal policy, leading to higher
interest rates (monetary policy being kept constant) would lead to a rise in capital inflow
(in the standard analysis). This would tend to cause appreciation, which will offset (at
least) part of the expansionary effect of the fiscal stimulus. If the predominant form of
capital flows is into equities, an expansionary fiscal policy could be expected to lead to a
much greater rise in net capital inflow. For with a fiscal expansion, both the pull of
higher interest rates and that of higher earnings expectations will be operating to
encourage capital inflow. This makes it more likely that there will be a degree of
appreciation of the currency of the country in question that will tend to offset the
expansionary effect of the stimulatory fiscal measures. This is more likely to be of
importance for a small and open economy – for which the exchange rate channel is
relatively more important than that of domestic markets for the operation of monetary13
policy – than for a large one. This consideration tends to favour the use of monetary
measures of expansion rather than fiscal ones, if the aim is to bring about a domestic
expansion; for with a monetary expansion, the fall in domestic interest rates still causes
some outflow of fixed-interest capital, which tends to cause the exchange rate to
weaken, whereas a fiscal expansion tends to raise interest rates and so cause
appreciation. (The effects on income-sensitive capital flows are common to both
monetary and fiscal forms of expansion.) As we saw in the preceding section, monetary
measures remain the preferable policy for affecting the exchange rate – or the level of
reserves in a fixed exchange rate system.
The Portfolio Balance Approach
The modifications that need to be made to the portfolio balance approach follow
logically from those suggested above for the Mundell-Fleming mode. (For the portfolio
balance model, see, for example, Branson(1979).) The portfolio balance approach also
has two income-earning assets, one within the country being considered and one in the
rest of the world. Both of these are fixed-interest assets. The other asset is money (in the
country whose policy is being discussed). When the country in question eases its
monetary policy, this leads its residents to increase their demand for the external asset,
the yield on which is now relatively higher than that available within their country. It
will also lead them to hold less money; but the responsiveness of their demand for the
external asset to the change in monetary policy is taken to be relatively greater (in terms
of elasticity) than that for money. Equilibrium then requires the exchange rate to
depreciate to the point where the consequently increased cost of the external asset
negates its greater attractiveness.14
If, however, the easing of monetary policy increases the attractiveness of income-
earning assets in the country where policy is eased, and if the principal form of capital
flow relates to equities, rather than to fixed-interest assets, the demand for domestic
assets could be expected to rise relative to that for external assets when monetary policy
is eased. Nor is this effect likely to be any more temporary than the opposite effect that
is expected on the basis of the standard models with only fixed-interest assets in the
model. For in both cases, there is a process of adjustment at work, which will eventually
peter out. But it is possible that some forms of equity flows, especially those relating to
direct investment, may take longer to occur than those into and out of fixed-interest
assets. The decision to set up a plant in another country, for example, is unlikely to be a
quick one. But there appears to be no a priori reason to expect that the likely period of
adjustment of the holdings of fixed-interest assets will be any more, or less, short-run or
temporary than those occurring through the markets for equity assets.
But in both cases, once the adjustment has been made, the effects on the exchange rate
through the current account will tend to offset the effect of the original capital flows. For
the income flows associated with the overseas capital holdings will eventually offset part
of the original flows of capital. Some of the original weakening of the currency (in the
case of the models with fixed-interest assets), or some of the appreciation associated
with equity capital flows into the country easing interest rates, will therefore be partly
reversed by the subsequent income flows arising from the earnings upon the
investments.
The effects on the exchange rate operating through the current account, as a result of the
effects of the policy changes on the level of demand, and so on trade, will of course be15
common to both models. An easing of monetary (or fiscal) policy will tend to weaken
the currency on this score. To this extent, therefore, the medium-run implications for
monetary, or fiscal, policy are not affected – at least in direction. The fact remains,
however, that in the short to medium run with which most central banks are concerned,
the implications of a policy change are different in degree, and may be different in
direction from the implications of the models that have been accepted as relevant
hitherto, especially for a large country.
Do flexible exchange rates still generally increase the domestic effects of monetary
policy, but probably not those of fiscal policy, if capital flows react to income changes?
One implication of the orthodox analysis – based on fixed-interest capital flows – is that
a change from a fixed exchange rate system to one of floating rates enhances the effects
of monetary policy changes upon domestic activity, but is less likely to enhance the
effect of fiscal measures.
This is because when monetary policy is eased (for example), and capital flows
outwards as a consequence of the fall in interest rates, this weakens the exchange rate,
and thus adds to domestic demand. On the other hand, a fiscal stimulus tends to attract
capital inflows seeking the consequently higher interest rates, and the consequent
appreciation strengthens the exchange rate, and so offsets some of the expansionary
effect, in a floating rate system. By contrast, with fixed rates, a monetary expansion
leads to a fall in the reserves, as capital flows out, and this reduces the expansionary
effect, whereas with a fiscal expansion, the consequent rise in capital inflow raises the
reserves and thus increases the expansionary effect. A change from fixed to flexible
exchange rates will enhance the effectiveness of fiscal measures in influencing domestic16
demand only if the depreciation resulting from the deterioration in the current account
balance resulting from a fiscal expansion exceeds the appreciation resulting from higher
capital inflow as a result of the higher interest rates.
If capital flows are sensitive to changes in income as well as to relative interest rates,
however, a change from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate system becomes much less
likely to enhance the domestic effectiveness of monetary policy, and also less likely to
enhance that of fiscal measures. For example, a monetary easing now tends to attract
capital inflow in search of the consequently higher earnings on equities, and that will
strengthen the exchange rate, offsetting some at least of the expansionary effect of the
monetary easing. Similarly, an easing of fiscal policy will also attract more capital in
search of higher earnings, so that a switch from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate will
be more likely to cause a degree of appreciation that will weaken or negate the
expansionary effects of fiscal measures.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Empirical Research
If capital flows are to some greater or smaller extent now sensitive to the actual or
expected level of income and earnings in a country, this requires some amendment to the
models on which the analysis of monetary and fiscal policy in an open economy is
based. In general, however, these new considerations do not overthrow the general
conclusions from the orthodox body of analysis, except that in the short run monetary
policy changes may have an effect on the exchange rate (or the on the reserves in a
fixed-exchange rate system) opposite to that which would have been expected if
international capital flows had been primarily influenced by relative interest rates.17
As major countries find it more difficult than small ones to change the level of their
interest rates relative to those in the rest of the world, to that extent the relevance for
policy of income-sensitive capital flows is more important for them. But, on the other
hand, as the exchange-rate channel for the operation of monetary (and fiscal) policy is
more important for smaller countries, to that extent the significance of income-sensitive
capital flows is more important for smaller countries. In short, both large and small
countries would do well to consider the relevance of income-sensitive capital flows to
them in determining their macroeconomic policies.
Clearly it would be helpful to have estimates of the degree of sensitivity of international
capital flows to both relative interest rate levels and expected levels of income and
earnings in a country. It would be of special interest to have evidence about whether the
exchange rates of major countries (in effect, the US and the euro area, and perhaps also
Japan) are relatively more subject to the influence of income-sensitive capital than to
that of interest rate-sensitive capital flows. It would also be helpful to know whether the
changes of policy to which income-sensitive capital flows are sensitive are the same (for
a given change in income) whether the change is in monetary policy or fiscal policy.
Furthermore, different sorts of fiscal policy – different tax changes and different changes
in government expenditure – could have different effects on income-sensitive capital
flows for a given effect on actual or expected income. But what seems no longer
defensible is to consider the effects on capital flows of changes in monetary and fiscal
policy purely in terms of their effects on relative interest rates, and to neglect their
possible effects through expected changes in income and earnings on equity investment.18
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